Open Mongolia and Mongol-Russian Relations by Batbayar, Tsedendambyn
 Number 5, 1998
38




Evolution of Mongolia’s role between Russia and China
The 1990s brought significant changes to Mongolia itself, and to its rela-
tions with the outside world. The Mongolian People’s Republic, which was
rightfully regarded as the Soviet closest ally in Asia during Cold War era, termi-
nated its existence after almost 70 years of its history (1924-1992). The new,
democratic and open Mongolia was born in January 1992.
Up to 1946, the Mongolian People’s Republic was acknowledged only by
its protector the Soviet Union. Its international recognition came with the end of
World War 2 when great powers arranged so-called Yalta post war system. The
Soviet leader Stalin insisted in the preservation of its status-quo and in its
eventual recognition by China as a part of Yalta arrangement which made pos-
sible Soviet entrance into war against Japan. After face-saving plebiscite con-
ducted in the MPR in October 1945 the Kuomintang China had to recognize
grudgingly the Mongolian People’s Republic in January 1946.
The birth of the communist China (October, 1949) was the most profound
event for Mongolian People’s Republic, in the 1950s. Ulaanbaatar recognized
Beijing on October 6, 1949, immediately after the founding of the People’s Re-
public of China. The independent status of the MPR was secured when a Sino-
Soviet joint communiqué was issued in Moscow in early 1950 following Mao
Zedong trip to the Soviet Union. For a brief period, the MPR enjoyed its role as
an important bridge in a larger Soviet-Chinese cooperative alliance.
By mid 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split left no choice for Mongolian leader-
ship. Ulaanbaatar took the Soviet position on every other issue which divided
Moscow and Beijing and agreed to conclude 1966 bilateral treaty with Moscow.
The twenty-year Treaty included unpublished defense-related agreements and
started a massive buildup in Mongolia of Soviet troops and missile bases. The
Mongolian People’s Republic became a frontline of Soviet defense against China
for about twenty years. Relations with China remained as the foremost concern
for the MPR leadership. Mongolia’s leader Tsedenbal maintained his ‘’cold war”
with China. Even Mao’s death in 1976 did not change his hostility and suspi-
cions toward China. Mongolia doubled the size of its army in response to a
request made by Soviet defense minister Ustinov to Tsedenbal while the latter
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visited Moscow in 1978. Soviet armed forces in Mongolia reached their peak of
120,000 men in 1979.
There was another important reason why Tsedenbal was so anti-China
oriented. Tsedenbal had a very powerful “China card” in his pocket, and he did
not hesitate to play it. Each twist and turn in Sino-Soviet relations was used as
an excellent argument to ask the Soviet Government to render more economic
assistance toward Mongolia. Because of the MPR’s geopolitical importance
Moscow agreed to unconditionally underwrite Mongolia’s two five-year plans
for 1971-75 and 1976-1980.1
During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Red Guards charged Tsedenbal
with allowing Moscow to maintain Mongolia as a “neocolonial ‘ dependency.
Tsedenbal used this kind of allegations as a great excuse to acquire more and
more aid from Moscow. For that reason, the Soviet Government paid 600 million
rubles to build a huge copper plant, called Erdenet, between 1973 and 1981 in
northern Mongolia, not far from Soviet border. This giant joint venture to pro-
cess copper and molybdenum concentrate was the biggest Soviet economic
project ever attempted in Mongolia, and became the MPR’s largest foreign cur-
rency earning enterprise.
By the beginning of 1980s major changes occurred in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. With Deng Xiaoping’s reform underway in rural China and Brezhnev’s
death in Moscow, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve eventually. However,
Tsedenbal failed to understand the new developments in Mongolia’s external
environment and continued to stage anti-Chinese campaigns in the hope of
getting more favors from Moscow. New leaders of the Kremlin, including
Gorbachev, not pleased by old tactics of Tsedenbal, asked the KGB to prove
Tsedenbal’s “critical health condition” and have him removed from the top po-
sition. Tsedenbal was ousted from office in August 1984.
Gorbachev’s Vladivostok initiative, including his offer to remove some
Soviet troops from Mongolia, was a surprise event for Ulaanbaatar which no
longer could enjoy its almost twenty year safe isolation from China. The same
thing was true for Mongolia’s relations with major western countries. With the
arrival of Shevardnadze to the Kremlin, Ulaanbaatar was allowed to enter into
direct negotiations with Washington. Shevardnadze’s January 1986 visit to
Ulaanbaatar, gave a “green light” to that issue and Mongolia established diplo-
matic relations with the US in January 1987.2
Encouraged by “new thinking” in Moscow Ulaanbaatar exchanged visits
with Beijing on a vice-foreign minister level and entered into diplomatic relations
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with the Republic of Korea before than Moscow did the same thing. Mongolian
foreign minister visited Japan in 1987 and in August 1989 Ulaanbaatar sug-
gested the creation of a “mechanism of political dialogue” in Northeast Asia to
discuss non-political issues, aimed at developing effective and mutually benefi-
cial cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, culture and
education, ecology and humanitarian links.
The breakthrough in Mongolia’s relations with its southern neighbor,
China, came in 1990-1991. P. Ochirbat, Mongolia’s newly elected President, went
first to Beijing, not to Moscow as usual, in May 1990 which had paved the way
for new kind of relations between Mongolia and China. With the announced
schedule of Soviet troops withdrawal from Mongolia due to be completed by
early 1992, the Chinese leaders had no reason to refuse in high-level return visit.
Yang Shangkun, the chairman of the PRC, paid an official four-day visit to
Ulaanbaatar, during which an intergovernmental agreement on Mongolia’s ac-
cess to the sea and transit transportation across Chinese territory with the use
of Tianjin port was signed. Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Ulaanbaatar in April
1994 and signed the new bilateral treaty between two countries.
In February, 1991, then Prime Minister D. Byambasuren paid a visit to
Moscow and met the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Fed-
erated Soviet Socialist Republic, I. S. Slave. The highlight of his visit was the
Declaration on Friendship and Good-Neighborly Cooperation concluded be-
tween Mongolia and Russia. Seventy years after the agreement of 5 November
1921, Mongolia and Russia reaffirmed the basis of their relations as one between
equal sovereign states and summarized the new trends on bilateral cooperation,
based on generally accepted principles of good-neighborly relations.
The period of adjustment in Mongol-Russian relations
In 1990 Mongolia held the first free elections in its 80 years of modern
history and has taken important steps toward a multiparty, pluralistic and demo-
cratic society. Perestroika in the Soviet Union and democratic changes in East-
ern Europe helped to create a favorable external environment. The political influ-
ence of the Soviet Union in Mongolia diminished substantially by late 1980s as
the Soviet government had to turn more toward its internal problems than to-
ward its allies.
It is interesting to note that the first priority for young democrats was how
to get rid of Soviet dominance rather than how to introduce democracy. The
specifics of the Mongolian transition were brought about by its political and
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economic status as the closest Soviet satellite. The uninterrupted rule of the
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) was seen as a political ar-
rangement for perpetuating the Mongolia’s inferior political status, and the re-
moval of the MPRP’s monopoly of power was seen as an act of political
decolonization.
The resignation of the MPRP Politburo in March 1990 led to the Constitu-
tional amendments that made possible the first free elections held in July 1990.
The standing legislature, Baga Hural, where the MRPR controlled about 60
percent of seats and young democrats the remaining 40 percent, became the
main parliamentary mechanism for the Mongolia’s smooth transition. Both MPRP
majority and democratic minority in the Baga Hural realized the urgent need for
a new constitution which would legitimize the emerging political and economic
institutions.
The new political elite were also aware of dramatically changing interna-
tional situation. To the south, China was pursuing its politically rigid strategy of
“building socialism with Chinese characteristics”, and to the north, Russia had
been thrown into a political, economic, constitutional, and federal turmoil. The
1992 new constitution established a domestic framework for a continued open
foreign policy and a new international orientation.3
The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December
1991 was greeted with cautious optimism by the Mongolian Government.
Mongolia quickly recognized the independence of the three Baltic States and
established diplomatic relations with them. Recognition of the republics in the
Commonwealth of Independent States by Mongolia followed soon.
Throughout 1992, scheduling a summit meeting and normalization of trade
flows were the two top priorities pf Mongolian diplomacy toward Russia. In
February, during a working visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Byambasuren facili-
tated the shipment of badly needed Russian oil but failed to meet the Russian
President. Russia sent a new ambassador - a 39-year old China expert, to
Ulaanbaatar in April. The question of a summit meeting was again raised before
President Yeltsin’s May visit to the Siberian regions neighboring Mongolia.
Russian side put forth the signing of a new treaty between the two countries as
a precondition for a summit meeting.
With the completion of the Russian troop withdrawal on September 15,
1992, Mongolia declared its intention of pursuing a course of balanced relations
with Russia as well as with China. Mongolia’s new Constitution legalized the
future policy of not allowing foreign troops to enter, be stationed in or pass
 Number 5, 1998
42
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
across its territory unless a relevant Mongolian legislation was adopted. Both
Russia and China welcomed Mongolia’s “neutral’ policy and committed them-
selves to respect Mongolia’s policy of not letting its territory be used against
any neighboring state.
The top priority in Mongolia’s next diplomacy was to fill the vacuum in its
foreign relations created by the Soviet Union’s disintegration, and revive full
political and economic relations with the newly independent republics of the
former USSR - first and foremost - the Russian Federation. President Ochirbat
went to Moscow in January 1993 for a long-awaited summit meeting with Presi-
dent Yeltsin, which produced tangible results. A number of important docu-
ments including a Joint statement on Stalinist purges of 1930s in Mongolia and
an agreement on transfer of former Soviet army property and buildings to Mon-
golian side were signed between two sides.
The signing of a new bilateral treaty, which excluded the mutual military
assistance clause of the previous (1966) treaty, was the highlight of the visit.
Russia recognized Mongolia’s nuclear free zone status and obliged to respect
Mongolia’s independent status. Article 4 of the treaty states that “the parties
shall not enter into any military-political bloc, directed against each other and
are committed not to conclude with third parties any treaties and agreements
contradicting the interests of sovereignty and independence of the other party”.
Although the two presidents exchanged opinions in a candid manner,
they failed to resolve the thorny debt problem which clouded the bilateral rela-
tions since 1990. Mongolia’s debt to the former USSR made mostly between
1970 and 1990 was surfaced as the most controversial issue between Mongolia
and Russia. The two sides disagree on USD value of the original 10 billion
transferable ruble debts. Some journalists and individuals in Mongolia even
argued that Mongolia owes Russia nothing at all.
However, two sides agreed to set up an intergovernmental commission to
discuss the whole complex of debt related issues. In these discussions Mongo-
lian side pointed out the particular historical circumstances in which debt was
accumulated which included the artificially low price of Mongolian livestock
products exports to Russia. The two sides could narrow their differences on the
estimation of present value of total debt and agreed to consider the factors
which caused the huge trade imbalance in favor of the USSR. Moreover, Rus-
sian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov during his visit in November 1995,
expressed Russian government’s readiness to write off a significant part of total
debt if a compromise will be reached between two parties.5
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Mongolia’s changing trade with Russia
The Mongolian People’s Republic used to receive substantial aid from the
former Soviet Union equivalent to about 30 percent of its GDP. Since 1962, it
enjoyed a “captive” market in the former Council of Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA) countries for many of its products. Prior to 1990, over 90 percent
of foreign trade was conducted with former Soviet Union and other CMEA
countries on the basis of so-called transferable rubles.
The disintegration of the USSR and the breakdown of trade with the CMEA
affected badly Mongolia’s economy. The import of petroleum from Russia has
become a question of survival for Mongolia. In the first four months of 1992,
Mongolia imported only 21 percent of the gasoline it needed to function nor-
mally. By early June 1992, two countries reached a number of agreements includ-
ing a projected trade volume of US$ 400 million in 1992, making payments in both
hard and national currencies, and the required supply by Russia of 800,000 tons
of oil.6                                                      .       ,
Both domestic and international trade regime has been effectively liberal-
ized since 1990. Former state-owned foreign trade companies ceased to operate
and both private and public enterprises have the right to conduct foreign trade
freely. With the exchange rate liberalization in May 1993, export licensing which
was practiced during 1990-1993 was formally abolished except for live animals
export.
The initial period of foreign trade disruption, especially import contraction
was over by 1993. The big rise in country’s import is registered since 1994.
According to the latest statistics of the government, Mongolia’s import was
US$ 443.4 million and export US$ 418 million in 1995. It can be explained by
somewhat lower world market price of Mongolia’s traditional export items in-
cluding copper and raw cashmere. These two export items still dominate.
Mongolia’s export with copper making almost 50 percent, with cashmere making
about 20 percent of total export.
The most notable change is in broad trade diversification, both in terms of
the destination of exports and the sources of imports. Geographical location of
foreign trade was diversified. Prior to 1990, over 90 percent of foreign trade was
conducted with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By 1995, 54.1
percent of export went to neighboring countries and East Asia, 24.5 percent to
Western Europe, and remaining 15.2 percent to Eastern Europe.
Trade with neighboring China and some other East Asian countries in-
creased rapidly. For example, trade with China increased from less than 2 percent
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of the Mongolia’s total in 1989 to about 24 percent in 1993. Although its volume
decreased to 15.5 percent in 1994, 12.5 percent of Mongolia’s total in 1995,
potential for growth remains. Mongolia’s export to China mostly consists of
animal skins and hides (30 percent), cashmere and wool (38 percent), and copper
(17 percent). Booming border trade between Mongolia and Chinese Inner
Mongolia, somehow declined since 1994, contributed to this remarkable growth.
Trade with the major traditional partner Russia is undergoing big adjust-
ment. Volume of trade with Russia and former CMEA countries declined from
almost 89 percent in 1989 to about 56 percent in 1993. Mongolia usually sells
most of its copper to Russia and buys all its petroleum also from Russia. Mongolia
is also still dependent on some crucial spare parts imports from Russia for its
power plants. Although Mongolia started to receive hard currency for its cop-
per, it had to pay world prices for badly needed fuel and petroleum products. For
1995, copper accounted 73.5 percent of Mongolia’s export to Russia, while pe-
troleum products accounted 21.4 percent of its import from Russia. Barter trade
made about 35 percent of total two-way trade because of hard currency short-
age both sides claim for.
According to foreign trade statistics of 1997, most of Mongolia’s foreign
trade was conducted with neighboring countries, including Russia, China, and
Kazakhstan. Most of Mongolia’s imports still come from Russia (36.2%), next
from China (14.3%), and Japan (7.5%). Similarly, most of Mongolia’s exports
went to China (21.7%) and Russia (9.6%) with Switzerland as the first export
destination (31.5%).7
Conclusion
The breakdown of the former Soviet Union left Mongolia virtually in a
great power vacuum. That vacuum - political, economic as well as ideological -
has produced at least three major results. First, for the first time in eighty years
it allowed Mongolia to pursue open and de facto independent foreign policy,
aimed at protecting its genuine national interests, enhancing ties with the United
States, Japan and other democracies. Second, Mongolia’s business links with
Russia declined dramatically and those with China, virtually stagnant for de-
cades, increased faster than with any other country.
This dramatic switch led to some speculation that Mongolia might turn to
China for protection, but that has not happened. Instead, once democracy and
a market economy were proclaimed as Mongolia’s paramount goals, the country
declared its intention of pursuing a course of somewhat balanced relations with
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Russia as well as with China. A third major result was that Mongolia became a
full-fledged member of the Non-Aligned
Movement, something the Soviet Union would never have permitted be-
cause it would have eroded the solidarity of the socialist bloc.
Russian Foreign Minister Primakov’s - the first ever visit of Russian For-
eign Minister since 1921 - visit to Ulaanbaatar in November 1996 opened the
opportunity for a fresh start in Mongol-Russian relations. Remake reassured the
Mongolia side that Russia will consider the historical circumstances in which
Mongolia’s debt was accumulated and will not put pressure on Mongolia to pay
immediately; payments can start after 2000 when a mutually acceptable solution
will be reached.
Primakov’s visit clearly reflected a rather new active attitude of the Kremlin
toward Mongolia than it was under Kozyrev’s Foreign Minister Years. Even
though old stereotypes die hard, new realities of Mongolia make to think Mos-
cow twice about its assets in Mongolia. Historically, during the past eighty
years Russian governments, be they Tsarist or Soviet, have always thought to
strengthen their position in Mongolia, and it would be naive to think that Russia
would voluntarily abandon this century-old policy. Economically, during the
Soviet period Mongolia became an important supplier of livestock materials and
mining, and with Soviet assistance hundreds of enterprises, including power
stations and modern housing, were built. Still, Russia’s economic presence is
enormous, including such large joint ventures, as Erdenet copper mining,
MonRostsvetmet fluorspar mining, and Ulaanbaatar Railway Company.
In cultural terms, most members of the Mongolian elite graduated from
Soviet universities, and Russian is still the most widely spoken foreign lan-
guage. In 1995, by Russian Presidential decree the number of Mongolian stu-
dents enrolled in Russian universities under Russian government scholarships
was increased from 20 to 80 each year.
Finally, the political and military-strategic factors still remain though they
have diminished in importance. Anatoly Arbatov of the Institute of World
Economy and International Relations, a well-known Moscow think tank, warned:
“The neutrality and sovereignty of Mongolia will represent a considerable se-
curity element in Asia, given China’s geostrategic position which is projected
toward the Russian Tran Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgystan. Hi case of a
Chinese dominant position in Mongolia, Russian defense needs in this region
would triple and communications with the Far East would become more vulner-
able”.8 this kind of thinking seems still strong among Russian security analysts
and military circles.
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